Abstract. We study two-player timed games where the objectives of the two players are not opposite. We focus on the standard notion of Nash equilibrium and propose a series of transformations that builds two finite turn-based games out of a timed game, with a precise correspondence between Nash equilibria in the original and in final games. This provides us with an algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in two-player timed games for large classes of properties.
Introduction
Timed games. Game theory (especially games played on graphs) has been used in computer science as a powerful framework for modelling interactions in embedded systems [16, 13] . Over the last fifteen years, games have been extended with the ability to depend on timing informations, taking advantage of the large development of timed automata [1] . Adding timing constraints allows for a more faithful representation of reactive systems, while preserving decidability of several important properties, such as the existence of a winning strategy for one of the agents to achieve her goal, whatever the other agents do [3] . Efficient algorithms exist and have been implemented, e.g. in the tool Uppaal-Tiga [4] .
Zero sum vs. non-zero sum games. In this purely antagonist view, games can be seen as two-player games, where one agent plays against another one. Moreover, the objectives of those two agents are opposite: the aim of the second player is simply to prevent the first player from winning her own objective. More generally, a (positive or negative) payoff can be associated with each outcome of the game, which can be seen as the amount the second player will have to pay to the first player. Those games are said to be zero-sum.
In many cases, however, games can be non-zero-sum: the objectives of the two players are then no more complementary, and the aim of one player is no more to prevent the other player from winning. Such games appear e.g. in various problems in telecommunications, where the agents try to send data on a network [12] . Focusing only on surely-winning strategies in this setting may then be too narrow: surely-winning strategies must be winning against any behaviour of the other player, and do not consider the fact that the other player also tries to achieve her own objective.
Nash equilibria. In the non-zero-sum game setting, it is then more interesting to look for equilibria. One of the most-famous and most-studied notion of equilibrium is that proposed by Nash in 1950 [14] : a Nash equilibrium is a behaviour of the players in which they act rationally, in the sense that no player can get a better payoff if she, alone, modifies her strategy [14] . Notice that a Nash equilibrium needs not exist in general, and may not be optimal, in the sense that several equilibria can coexist, and may have very different payoffs. Our contribution. We extend the standard notion of Nash equilibria to timed games, where non-determinism naturally arises and has to be taken into account. We propose a whole chain of transformations that builds, given a two-player timed game, two turnbased finite games which, in some sense that we will make precise, preserve Nash equilibria. The first transformation consists in building a finite concurrent game with non-determinism based on the classical region abstraction; the second transformation decouples this concurrent game into two concurrent games, one per player: in each game, the preference relation of one of the players is simply dropped, but we have to consider "joint" equilibria. The last two transformations work on each of the two copies of the concurrent game: the first one solves the non-determinism by giving an advantage to the associated player, and the last one makes use of this advantage to build a turn-based game equivalent to the original concurrent game. This chain of transformations is valid for the whole class of two-player timed games, and Nash equilibria are preserved for a large class of objectives, for instance -regular objectives 1 . These transformations allow to recover some known results about zero-sum games, but also to get new decidability results for Nash equilibria in two-player timed games. Related work. Nash equilibria (and other related solution concepts such as subgameperfect equilibria, secure equilibria, ...) have recently been studied in the setting of (untimed) games played on a graph [8-10, 15, 17-20] . None of them, however, focuses on timed games. In the setting of concurrent games, mixed strategies (i.e., strategies involving probabilistic choices) are arguably more relevant than pure (i.e., non-randomized) strategies. However, adding probabilities to timed strategies involves several important technical issues (even in zero-sum non-probabilistic timed games), and we defer the study of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in two-player timed games to future works.
For lack of space, proofs are omitted and can be found in [5] .
Preliminaries

Timed games
A valuation over a finite set of clocks Cl is a mapping : Cl → ℝ + . If is a valuation and ∈ ℝ + , then + is the valuation that assigns to each ∈ Cl the value ( )+ . If is a valuation and ⊆ Cl, then [ ← 0] is the valuation that assigns 0 to each ∈ and ( ) to each ∈ Cl∖ . A clock constraint over Cl is a formula built on the grammar: ℭ(Cl) ∋ ::= ∼ | ∧ , where ranges over Cl, ∼ ∈ {<, ≤, =, ≥, >}, and is an integer. The semantics of clock constraints over valuations is natural, and we omit it.
Definition 1.
A timed automaton is a tuple ⟨Loc, Cl, Inv, Trans⟩ such that:
-Loc is a finite set of locations; -Cl is a finite set of clocks; -Inv : Loc → ℭ(Cl) assigns an invariant to each location; -Trans ⊆ Loc × ℭ(Cl) × 2 Cl × Loc is the set of transitions.
We assume the reader is familiar with timed automata [1] , and in particular with states (pairs (ℓ, ) ∈ Loc × ℝ + such that |= Inv(ℓ)), runs (seen as infinite sequences of states for our purpose), etc. We now define the notion of two-player timed games. The two players will be called player 1 and player 2. Our definition follows that of [11] .
Definition 2. A (two-player) timed game is a tuple = ⟨Loc, Cl, Inv, Trans, Owner, (≼ 1 , ≼ 2 )⟩ where:
-⟨Loc, Cl, Inv, Trans⟩ is a timed automaton; -Owner : Trans → {1, 2} assigns a player to each transition;
is a quasi-order on runs of the timed automaton, called the preference relation for player .
A timed game is played as follows: from each state of the underlying timed automaton (starting from an initial state 0 = (ℓ, 0), where 0 maps each clock to zero), each player chooses a nonnegative real number and a transition , with the intended meaning that she wants to delay for time units and then fire transition . There are several (natural) restrictions on these choices:
-spending time units in ℓ must be allowed 2 i.e., + |= Inv(ℓ); -= (ℓ, , , ℓ ′ ) belongs to the current player (given by function Owner); -the transition is firable after time units (i.e., + |= ), and the invariant is satisfied when entering ℓ
When there is no such possible choice for a player (for instance if there is no transition from ℓ belonging to that player), she chooses a special move, denoted by ⊥. From a state (ℓ, ) and given a choice ( 1 , 2 ) for the two players, with ∈ (ℝ + ×Trans)∪{⊥}, an index 0 such that 0 = min{ | = ( , ) and ∈ {1, 2}} is selected (non-deterministically if both delays are identical), and the corresponding transition 0 = (ℓ, , , ℓ ′ ) is applied, leading to a new state (ℓ ′ , [ ← 0]( + 0 )). To ensure well-definedness of the above semantics we assume in the sequel that timed games are non-blocking, that is, for any reachable state (ℓ, ), at least one player has an allowed transition (this avoids that both players play the special action ⊥).
The outcome of such a game when players have fixed their various choices is a run of the underlying timed automaton, that is an element of
, and possible outcomes are compared by each player using their preference relations. In the examples, we will define the preference relation of a player by assigning a value (called a payoff ) to each possible outcome of the game, and the higher the payoff, the better the run in the preference relation. 2 Formally, this should be written + ′ |= Inv(ℓ) for all 0 ≤ ′ ≤ , but this is equivalent to having only |= Inv(ℓ) and + |= Inv(ℓ) since invariants are convex.
This semantics can naturally be formalized in terms of an infinite-state non-deterministic concurrent game and strategies, that we will detail in the next section. Example 1. We give an example of a timed game, that we will use as a running example: consider the timed game on the right. When relevant the name of a transition is printed on the corresponding edge. Owners of the transitions are specified as follows: player 1 plays with plain edges, whereas player 2 plays with dotted edges. On the right of these locations we indicate payoffs for the two players (if a play ends up in ℓ 1 , player 1 gets payoff 1, whereas player 2 gets payoff 0). Hence player 1 will prefer runs ending in ℓ 1 or ℓ 3 than runs ending in ℓ 2 . 
Concurrent games
In this section we define two-player concurrent games, which we then use to encode the formal semantics of timed games. A transition system is a 2-tuple = ⟨States, Edg⟩ where States is a (possibly uncountable) set of states, and Edg ⊆ States × States is the set of transitions. A path in is a non-empty sequence ( ) 0≤ < (where ∈ ℕ ∪ {+∞}) of states of such that ( , +1 ) ∈ Edg for all < − 1. The length of , denoted by | | is − 1. The set of finite paths (also called histories in the sequel) of is denoted by 3 Hist , the set of infinite paths (also called plays) of is denoted by Play , and Path = Hist ∪ Play is the set of paths of . Given a path = ( ) 0≤ < and an integer ≤ | |, the -th prefix of , denoted by ≤ , is the finite path ( ) 0≤ < +1 . If = ( ) 0≤ < is a history, we write last( ) = | | . We extend the definition of concurrent games given e.g. in [2] with non-determinism:
-⟨States, Edg⟩ is a transition system; -Act is a (possibly uncountable) set of actions; -Mov : States × {1, 2} → 2 Act ∖ {∅} is a mapping indicating the actions available to each player in a given state; -Tab : States×Act 2 → 2 Edg ∖{∅} associates to each state and each pair of actions the set of resulting edges. It is required that if
-for each ∈ {1, 2}, ≼ ⊆ States × States is a quasi-order called the preference relation for player .
A deterministic concurrent game is a concurrent game where Tab( , ( 1 , 2 )) is a singleton for every ∈ States and ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ Mov( , 1)×Mov( , 2). A turn-based game is a concurrent game for which there exists a mapping Owner : States → {1, 2} such that, for every state ∈ States, the set Mov( , ) is a singleton unless Owner( ) = .
In a concurrent game, from some state , each player selects one action among its set Mov( , ) of allowed actions (the resulting pair ( 1 , 2 ) is called a move). This results in a set of edges Tab( , ( 1 , 2 )), one of which is applied and gives the next state of the game. In the sequel, we abusively write Hist , Play and Path for the corresponding set of paths in the underlying transition system of . We also write Hist ( ), Play ( ) and Path ( ) for the respective subsets of paths starting in state .
Definition 4. Let be a concurrent game, and ∈ {1, 2}. A strategy for player is a mapping : Hist → Act such that ( ) ∈ Mov(last( ), ) for all ∈ Hist . A strategy profile is a pair ( 1 , 2 ) where is a player-strategy. We write Strat for the set of strategies of player in , and Prof for the set of strategy profiles in .
Notice that we only consider non-randomized (pure) strategies in this paper.
Let be a concurrent game, ∈ {1, 2}, and be a player -strategy. A path = ( ) 0≤ ≤| | is compatible with the strategy if, for all ≤ | | − 1, there exists a pair of actions
A path is compatible with a strategy profile ( 1 , 2 ) whenever it is compatible with both strategies 1 and 2 . We write Out , ( ) (resp. Out , ( 1 , 2 )) for the set of paths from (also called outcomes) in that are compatible with strategy (resp. strategy profile ( 1 , 2 ) ). Notice that, in the case of deterministic concurrent games, a strategy profile has a single infinite outcome. This might not be the case for non-deterministic concurrent games.
Given a move ( 1 , 2 ) and a new action ′ for player , we write
This notation is extended to strategies in a natural way.
In the context of non-zero-sum games, several notions of equilibria have been defined. We present a refinement of Nash equilibria towards non-deterministic concurrent games.
Definition 5. Let be a concurrent game, and be a state of . A pseudo Nash equilibrium in from is a tuple (( 1 , 2 ), ) where ( 1 , 2 ) ∈ Prof , and ∈ Out ( , ) ( 1 , 2 ) is such that for all ∈ {1, 2} and all ′ ∈ Strat , it holds:
Such an outcome is called a best play for the strategy profile ( 1 , 2 ).
In the case of deterministic games, is uniquely determined by ( 1 , 2 ), and pseudo Nash equilibria coincide with Nash equilibria as defined in [14] : they are strategy profiles where no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from her strategy.
In the case of non-deterministic games, a strategy profile for an equilibrium may give rise to several outcomes. The choice of playing the best play is then made cooperatively by both players: once both strategies are fixed, it is the interest of both players to cooperate and play "optimally".
Back to timed games
Two comments are in order here: ( ) non-determinism in timed games could be dropped by giving priority to one of the players, in case both of them play the same delay. Our algorithm could of course be adapted in this case; ( ) even if the timed game were deterministic, our transformation to region games involves some extra non-determinism. As will be seen in the sequel, the above notion of pseudo Nash equilibria is the notion we need for our construction to preserve equilibria.
It is easy to see the semantics of a timed game as the semantics of an infinite-state concurrent game (see the research report [5] ). Using that point-of-view, timed games inherit the notions of history, play, path, strategy, profile, outcome and pseudo Nash equilibrium. We illustrate some of these notions on the running example.
Example 1 (Cont'd). This game starts in configuration (ℓ 0 , 0) (clock is set to 0). A strategy profile is then determined by an initial choice for the first transition. If one of the players choose some delay smaller than 1, she will have payoff 1 but the other player will have payoff 0, hence the other player will be able to preempt this choice and choose a smaller delay that will improve her own payoff. Hence there will be no such pseudo Nash equilibrium. There is a single pseudo Nash equilibrium, where player 1 chooses (1, ) (delay for 1 t.u. and take transition ) and player 2 chooses (1, ). The best play for that strategy profile is the run taking transition .
In this paper we will be interested in the computation of pseudo Nash equilibria in timed games. To do so we propose a sequence of transformations that will preserve equilibria (in some sense), yielding the construction of two turn-based finite games in which the initial problem will be reduced to the computation of twin Nash equilibria. All these transformations are presented in the next section. These transformations will also give a new point-of-view on timed games, which we will use in Section 4.2 to recover some decidability results. Many more results are expected.
From timed games to turn-based finite games
In this section we propose a chain of transformations of the timed game into two turn-based finite games, and reduce the computation of pseudo Nash equilibria in to the computation of 'twin' Nash equilibria in the two turn-based games. Notice that we will have to impose restrictions on the preference relations: indeed, price-optimal reachability is undecidable in two-player priced timed games, and these quantitative objectives can be encoded as a payoff function, see [7] for details.
From timed games to concurrent games...
We assume the reader is familiar with the region automaton abstraction for timed automata [1] . Let = ⟨Loc, Cl, Inv, Trans, Owner, (≼ 1 , ≼ 2 )⟩ be a timed game. Let ℜ be the set of regions for the timed automaton underlying , and ℜ be the projection over the regions ℜ (for configurations, runs, etc.) We define the region game ℛ = ⟨States, Edg, Act, Mov, Tab, (≼ 
and Owner( ) = } if this set is non-empty, and Mov((ℓ, ), ) = {⊥} otherwise.
, 2} and = ( , ) with = ′ , (ℓ, , , ℓ ) = and |= } -The preference relation ≼ ℛ for player is defined by saying that ≼ ℛ ′ iff there exists and
Note that the game ℛ is non-deterministic, even if the original timed game is not. Indeed, non-determinism appears when players want to play delays leading to the same region. The (relative) order of the choices for the delays chosen by the two players cannot be distinguished by the region abstraction.
Definition 6. A preference relation ≼ is said to be region-uniform when for all plays and ′ , if the sequence of regions seen in both paths are the same, then they are equivalent, i.e. ≼ ′ and ′ ≼ .
Proposition 7.
Let be a timed game, and assume that the two preference relations of are region-uniform. Let ℛ be its associated region game. Then there is a pseudo Nash equilibrium in from (ℓ 0 , 0) with best play iff there is a pseudo Nash equilibrium in ℛ from (ℓ 0 , [0] ℜ ) with best play ℜ ( ). Furthermore, this equivalence is constructive.
Example 1 (Cont'd).
We illustrate the construction and the previous notions on the running example. We write 0 (resp. 1 , 2 ) for the region = 0 (resp. 0 < < 1, = 1). The region game ℛ is as depicted on Fig. 1 . In this region game, there are two non-deterministic transitions. First when the two players choose to wait until region 2 , in which case the game can turn to either ℓ 2 or to ℓ 3 . Then when both players choose to move within the region 1 (there is an uncertainty on whether player 1 or player 2 was faster), and depending on who was faster, the game will move to either ℓ 1 or ℓ 2 . The first non-determinism is inherent to the game (and could be removed by construction assuming one player is more powerful, see Subsection 2.3 for explanations), whereas the second non-determinism is (somehow) artificial and comes from the region abstraction.
In , there is a single pseudo Nash equilibrium, where both players wait until = 1 (region 2 ), and propose to move respectively to ℓ 3 (resp. ℓ 2 ). The best play is then (ℓ 0 , 0)(ℓ 3 , 0)
* . This corresponds to the unique pseudo Nash equilibrium that we find in the region game.
The transition table from (ℓ0, 0) (i.e., Tab((ℓ0, 0), ( 1, 2))): Given a concurrent non-deterministic finite game ℛ = ⟨States, Edg, Act, Mov, Tab,
2 )⟩, we construct two concurrent games ℛ 1 and ℛ 2 where we simply forget the preferences of one player. Formally for ∈ {1, 2}, we define the game ℛ = ⟨States, Edg, Act, Mov, Tab, (≼ 1 , ≼ 2 )⟩, where ≼ is the quasi-order ≼ , and ≼ 3− is the trivial quasi-order where all runs are equivalent.
Definition 8.
A twin pseudo Nash equilibrium for the two games ℛ 1 and ℛ 2 is a tuple ((
2 ), ) is a pseudo Nash equilibrium in the game ℛ 1 and ((
2 ), ) is a pseudo Nash equilibrium in the game ℛ 2 . We furthermore say that is a best play for the twin pseudo equilibrium.
We relate pseudo Nash equilibria in ℛ with twin pseudo Nash equilibria in ℛ 1 and ℛ 2 . Note that we require best plays be the same, but not strategies. Proposition 9. Let ℛ be the region game associated with some timed game . Then there is a pseudo Nash equilibrium in ℛ from with best play if and only if there is a twin pseudo equilibrium for the corresponding games ℛ 1 and ℛ 2 from with best play . Furthermore this equivalence is constructive.
... next to concurrent deterministic games...
We transform each game ℛ into a concurrent deterministic game . Game will give priority to player , in that it will be the role of player to solve non-determinism. The game = ⟨States, Edg, Act ′ , Mov , Tab , (≼ 1 , ≼ 2 )⟩ is defined as follows:
we have that Tab( , ( 1 , 2 ) ) has at least one element, and at most two elements.
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• In case it has only one element, then setting ( 1 , 2 ) ); • In case it has two elements, say ( , • ) and ( , ∘ ), one of them comes from a transition of player in and the other comes from a transition of player 3 − in . Hence w.l.o.g. we can assume that ( , • ) belongs to player . We now define ′ 3− = 3− and for any ′ ∈ {( , •), ( , ∘)}, we define:
By construction, the two games 1 and 2 are deterministic, and they share the same structure. Only decisions on how to solve non-determinism are made by different players. Our aim will be to compute equilibria in these two similar games.
Proposition 10. Assume (with ∈ {1, 2}) is the deterministic concurrent game defined from the concurrent game ℛ . Then there is a pseudo Nash equilibrium in ℛ from with best play iff there is a Nash equilibrium in from with best play . 
Example 1 (Cont'd).
We build on the previous example, and give the two games 1 and 2 in Fig. 2 . An action ( , ★) denotes either ( , •) or ( , ∘). There are several Nash equilibria in game 1 : one where the first player chooses (( 2 , ), •) and the second player chooses ( 2 , ), which leads to (ℓ 3 , 0 ) with payoff (1, 0); and one where both players play a pair of actions leading to (ℓ 1 , 0 ), in which case the payoff is also (1, 0) .
Similarly there are several Nash equilibria in game 2 : one where the second player chooses (( 2 , ), ∘) and the first player chooses ( 2 , ), which leads to (ℓ 3 , 0 ) with payoff (0, 1); the second one where both players play a pair of actions leading to (ℓ 2 , 0 ), in which case the payoff is also (0, 1).
There is a single twin equilibrium in 1 and 2 , namely the one leading to state (ℓ 3 , 0 ), which coincides with those equilibria already found in and ℛ.
... and finally to two turn-based games
In the (deterministic) concurrent game , the advantage is given to player , who has the ability to solve non-determinism. We can give a slightly different interpretation to that mechanism, which takes into account an interpretation of the new actions. Indeed, actions have a timed interpretation in the original timed game, and can be ordered w.r.t. their delay. Taking advantage of this order on actions, we build a turn-based game . Let = ⟨States, 0 , Edg, Act ′ , Mov , Tab , (≼ 1 , ≼ 2 )⟩ be the games obtained from the previous construction. Let ∈ States. We naturally order the set Mov ( , 1) ∪ Mov ( , 2) with a relation < so that:
This is possible due to the definition of game : when ( , 3− ) is allowed to player 3 − from , and (( , ), •) and (( , ), ∘) are allowed to player from , then the three actions are totally ordered by < as follows:
. Intuitively an action with marker • means that player can play her own transition faster than player 3 − can play her own transition, but also that she can decide to play more slowly (role of action with marker ∘).
We can also define an equivalence relation = compatible with this order, by saying
It is worth noticing that = ′ implies that they belong to the same player. This can be the case if two transitions are available to a player from the same region, and also if a player can only play action ⊥. We will write [ ] for the equivalence class associated to . We next say that [ ] belongs to player whenever all actions in [ ] belong to player .
Example 1 (Cont'd).
Consider games 1 and 2 depicted in Fig. 2 . In game 1 , the order on actions (written simply as <) from (ℓ 0 , 0 ) is given by:
Below each action we write the target state when this action is played, provided an action smaller (for the order <) is not played by the other player. There is no target with action (( 2 , ), ∘) because it is always preempted by some 'faster' action (no ⊥ action is available in our example). In game 2 , the order on actions (also written <) from (ℓ 0 , 0 ) is given by:
We will take advantage of this order on actions to build turn-based games that will in some sense be equivalent with the previous concurrent (deterministic) games. The idea will be to take the smallest action(s) in the order, and ask the corresponding player whether or not she wants to play that action; if yes, we proceed with this action in the game, otherwise we do the same with the second action in the order until one of the players plays her action; The meaning in the context of timed games is actually also the following: we see that if the two players want to play in the same region, then in game the advantage of player is that we first ask her whether she wishes to play her action (role of action labelled with •), then if not, the other player will be asked to decide whether she wants to play her own action, and finally, if not, we ask a last time player whether she wants to play her action (now she has the additional knowledge that the other player didn't choose her own action).
Formally we define the turn-based game as follows:
-The set Edg is defined as follows:
-The set of available actions is defined as follows:
• if [ ] belongs to player , then we use the new action del (for delay):
The transition table is defined as follows:
• if [ ] belongs to player 1:
for every < ′′ and ′ is minimal w.r.t.
• the second case ([ ] belongs to player 2) is similar, just swap or del with ⊥. -In order to define the preference relations we first define a projection from plays in the turn-based game onto plays in the concurrent game . Pick a run in , and define its projection ( ) in as follows: if 
Note that the game is turn-based 8 and that a state ( , [ ] ) belongs to player such that ∈ Mov ( , ) (as already mentioned this is independent of the choice of in [ ] ). The structure of the turn-based games 1 and 2 are now slightly different from that of the previous concurrent deterministic games 1 and 2 .
Proposition 11. Let (with ∈ {1, 2}) be the previous deterministic concurrent game, and let be the associated turn-based game. There is a Nash equilibrium in from with best play ( ) iff there is a Nash equilibrium in from ( , [ ] ) with best play , where is a minimal action w.r.t. < . Furthermore this equivalence is constructive.
Example 1 (Cont'd). We build on our running example, and compute the corresponding games 1 and 2 . They are displayed on Fig. 3 . Plain states and plain edges belong to Theorem 12. Let be a timed game with region-uniform preference relations. Assume 1 and 2 are the two turn-based (deterministic) games constructed in this section. Then, there is a pseudo Nash equilibrium in from (ℓ 0 , 0) with best play iff there are two Nash equilibria in 1 and 2 from ((ℓ 0 , 0), [ ] (ℓ0,0) ) with best plays 1 and 2 respectively, where is a minimal action w.r.t. < (ℓ0,0) , such that 1 ( 1 ) = 2 ( 2 ) = ℜ ( ). Furthermore this equivalence is constructive. Remark 1. The three-player game on the right has several Nash equilibria, for instance player 1 (plain arrows) chooses her transition at time 0.6, player 2 (dotted arrows) chooses her transition at time 0.7, and player 3 (dashed arrows) chooses her transition at time 0.8. If we build the region abstraction, each player will have a single possible move (play her transition in the region 0 < < 1), and the game will proceed by selecting non-deterministically one of them. There would be several ways to extend the method developed in this paper to three players: have a copy of the game for each player, assuming she plays against a coalition of the other players, or have a copy of the game for each priority order given to the players. It is not hard to be convinced that none of these choices will be correct on this example.
4 Decidability results
Some general decidability results
We first need a representation for the preference relations (which must be region-uniform) of both players. Let = ⟨Loc, Cl, Inv, Trans, Owner, (≼ 1 , ≼ 2 )⟩ be a two-player timed game. We assume the preference relation for player is given by a (possibly infinite) sequence of linear-time objectives ( ) ≥1 where it is better for a run to satisfy than as soon as > (w.l.o.g. we assume that +1 implies ¬ for all ≤ ). In other terms, the aim of player is to minimize the index for which the play belongs to . These objectives include -regular or LTL-definable objectives, and also more quantitative objectives (for instance, given a distinguished goal state Goal ∈ Loc for player , by defining to be the set of traces visiting Goal in less than steps. We first need to (be able to) transfer objectives (and preference relations) to the two turn-based games 1 and 2 : a linear-time objective in is said to be transferable to game whenever we can construct an objectiveˆ such that for every run in , |=ˆ iff for all with ℜ ( ) = ( ), |= . It is said transferable whenever it is transferable to both 1 and 2 . For example, notice that (sequences of) stutter-free region-uniform objectives are transferable.
Nash equilibria in game will be rather easy to characterize since player 3 − will never be enclined to deviate from her strategy (all runs are equivalent for her preference relation). We assume all objectives are transferable, and we write 3− ( ) for the set of winning states in game for player 3 − with the objective ⋀ 1≤ < ( ¬ˆ ) . Those sets are computable for many classes of objectives. Then: Theorem 13. Let be a timed game with preference relations given as transferable, region-uniform, prefix-independent sequences ( ) of objectives. There is a pseudo Nash equilibrium in with payoff ( 1 , 2 ) iff there are two runs 1 in 1 and 2 in 2 s.t.
Notice that this allows to handle -regular (and LTL-definable) objectives by considering the product of the game with a suitable (deterministic) automaton.
The sequence of states ( 3− ( )) ≥1 in game is non-increasing and hence stationary (because is finite-state). Hence there exist indices ℎ 0 = 1 < ℎ 1 < ℎ 2 < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < ℎ such that the function → 3− ( ) is constant on all intervals [ℎ , ℎ +1 ) and on [ℎ , +∞). Those indices can be computed together with the corresponding sets of winning states. Then the only possible equilibria in are those such that there is a run satisfyingˆ that stays furthermore within the set 3− (ℎ ) if ℎ ≤ < ℎ +1 , or within 3− (ℎ ) if ≥ ℎ . This can be done for instance if each player is given a goal state Goal , and is "reach Goal in steps". In that case, 3− (ℎ ) is the set of states from which player 3 − can avoid Goal . Hence we can compute Nash equilibria in two-player timed games where each player tries to minimize the number of steps to the goal state. This allows to recover part of the results of [8] for two-player games.
Zero-sum games
Our chain of transformations also yields a new point-of-view on classical two-player timed games with zero-sum objectives. In that case the preference relation of player 1 is characterized by the sequence ( , ¬ ) whereas that of player 2 is characterized by the sequence (¬ , ). In that case we say that the objective of player 1 is . Theorem 14. Let be a zero-sum timed game where player 1's objective is , and is assumed to be transferable. Then player 1 has a winning strategy in from (ℓ, 0) iff player 1 has a winning strategy in game 2 from (ℓ, [0]) for the objectiveˆ .
Conclusion
We have proposed a series of transformations of two-player timed games into two turnbased finite games. These transformations reduce the computation of Nash equilibria in timed games for a large class of objectives (the so-called region-uniform objectives) to the computation of "twin" equilibria for related objectives in the two turn-based finite games. We give an example on how this can be used to compute Nash equilibria in timed games. In turn our transformations give a nice and new point-of-view on zero-sum timed games, which can then be interpreted as a turn-based finite game.
Our method does not extend to players. In [6] , we have developed a completely new approach that allows to compute Nash equilibria in timed games with an arbitrary number of players but only for reachability objectives. We plan to continue working on the computation of Nash equilibria in timed games with an arbitrary number of players.
Another interesting research direction is the computation of other kinds of equilibria in timed games (secure equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibria, etc). We believe that the transformations that we have made in this paper are correct also for these other notions, and that we can for instance reduce the computation of subgame-perfect equilibria to the computation of subgame-perfect equilibria in the two turn-based finite games. A major difference is that Theorem 13 has to be refined. Tree automata could be the adequate tool for this problem [17] .
